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D

eterrence, as articulated in the National Military Strategy,l promotes the
ideal condition for the protection of the environment. The devastation of
the aggressor's homeland should be reason enough to pursue a course other than
war ••. yet wars exists. Certainly, in the course of the two World Wars, mankind
took a severe toll on the environment-to say nothing of his fellow man. During
the Cold War era, the military forces of the two superpowers necessarily had an
adverse impact on the environment as they prepared for possible conflict. The
environmental damage caused by fifty years ofweapons development, maintaining
large standing forces, and exercising and operating their forces, has yet to be fully
assessed. But it certainly is far less than would have been the case if World War
III had come to pass. The environmental damage, as seen on CNN, during the
Gulf War highlighted again the degradation that military forces can inflict on the
environment in wartime, increasing pressure to regulate the impact that military
operations have on the environment in war, as well as peace.
From a military perspective, remedies for environmental concerns should be
pursued with appropriate consideration given to future contingencies requiring the
use of military force; preventing friction between environmental policy and the
realities of military conflict. An absolute ban on environmental damage caused by
military operations is inconceivable. War by definition is a "no holds barred affair".
Thus, the real issue is how best to minimize the environmental impact of military
operations without constraining the military commander with policies that have little
chance ofserious consideration in wartime. But most importantly, we must not create
uncertainty or risk aversion in the minds ofour commanders regarding environmental
considerations that could be exploited by their adversaries.

The Nature of War
Doctrine defmes war as "a violent clash between two hostile, independent, and
irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other."z The very nature
of war is synonymous with human casualties and environmental damage. Warfare
will always have an adverse impact on the environment; the extent will depend on
the willingness of warring nations to conform to environmental regulations that
may constrain their ability to achieve victory in the war. Thus, as a practical matter,
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expansion of the law of war to cover environmental concerns could be done in a
manner similar to the approach taken in addressing humanitarian concerns. That
is, avoiding environmental impact cannot be absolute; clauses like "military
necessity" will be needed to recognize that a military commander realistically
cannot be expected to place his force or his mission achievement at grave risk to
enemy action in order to protect the environment. Nevertheless, military
commanders can legitimately be expected to show due regard for avoiding
unnecessary environmental damage in the conduct of warfare.
Can war be fought with due regard to the environment? Environmental concerns are
having an increasingly significant impact on the conduct of peacetime U.S. military
operations. But does compliance with environmental regulations end when war begins?
Simply put, can we effectively conduct war using environmental "Marquis of
Queensberry" rules when dea1ingwith a "street fighter"who is notsimilarlyconstrained?
Naval Warfare Imperatives
Operating on and from the sea, naval forces have a unique ability to provide
credible combat forces throughout the world. With the sudden change from the
Cold War-with a single, overriding global threat posed by the other
superpower-to the post-Cold War environment of multiple potential regional
security challenges, the operational demands placed on naval forces have become
much more diverse. Naval forces are increasingly being called on to provide the
myriad capabilities needed to ensure success across the entire spectrum of military
operations. In order to respond decisively to the crisis of the future, we must
remain ready, flexible, self-sustaining and mobile in peacetime.3 In war, we must
maneuver and project fires without restraints. Underpinning the Navy's ability to
provide credible combat forces prior to conflict and during combat are four
strategic naval imperatives: realistic, demanding operational training, unimpeded
mobility at sea, proven warfighting doctrine and effective weapons.
Training
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps train to fight and win the nation's wars. In
doing so, we train to a high level of professional competency that allows us to also
carry out a broad range of military operations while we posture ourselves for war.
Any encroachment on our ability to conduct operational training degrades mission
effectiveness. Skills such as anti-submarine warfare can only be honed through the
prosecution of targets which requires the deployment of sonobuoys, smokes,
explosive signaling devices and torpedoes (exercise and war reserve). Our naval
aircraft must conduct low-level bombing on land and sea targets and surface ships
must fire their guns. Naval forces must seize, and be given, every opportunity to
utilize these weapon systems under conditions which simulate realistic operations.
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Not doing so ultimately creates exploitable vulnerabilities within naval forces.
Without training as we intend to fight, we limit the effective utilization of the force
in time of war.
Although environmental regulations are not aimed at naval forces specifically,
they require compliance that impacts, directly or indirectly, on our ability to train
effectively. Statutes such as the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Statute designate various sea areas as national marine sanctuaries. As the number
of these sanctuaries increase, they begin to encroach on traditional near-shore
training areas. These statutes require vessels to delay, modify or cease training in
order to protect certain species of marine life. This conformance significantly
affects naval training operations in or near these sanctuaries. A newly established
marine sanctuary in Hawaii, for example, and the designated whale critical habitats
in submarine transit areas off Georgia and Florida, may lend to a serious impact
on naval operations. Although these areas may not be completely restrictive, they
do require added operator awareness and compliance efforts that can detract from
the realism and effectiveness of training. Environmental compliance has thus
become an integral part ofplanning naval operational training. Ultimately, a poi~t
could be reached in which environmental regulations significantly degrade the
effectiveness of operational training. At this juncture, we will have reached,a point
where our military no longer has the confidence or capability to meet the enemy
on his terms without incurring unnecessary loses. Protecting the environment at
the expense of human life does not meet anyone's sanity test. The challenge, thus,
is to credibly articulate that in peacetime.
Weapon firings are a crucial element of peacetime training for combat ,readiness
on deployment. But weapon firings are also of great concern to environmentalists.
The military weapons range on Kahoolave Island in Hawaii was closed for several
reasons; some included environmental concerns. Other weapons firing ranges are
subjects of possible closure or added restrictions. Recently, the Olympic Coast
National Marine Sanctuary, an area of several thousand square miles, prohibited all
bombing activity in a preexisting training area. As weapons firing ranges are closed
or subjected to restrictive regulations, the impact on combat readiness will increase.
Naval forces will continue to be innovative and resourceful in working around these
obstacles while pursuing their training objectives. But a trend is apparent that could
eventually produce shortfalls in our combat readiness.

Mobility
This nation, by virtue ofits geography, is a maritime nation. Our vital interests are
worldwide. When combined with our national strategy of engagement, naval forces
become the force of choice to operate forward and to be engaged, poised to defend
critica1links abroad. An enduring attribute ofnaval forces remains its ability to operate
forward in support of national interest, secure through mobility upon the waters of
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the world. The law of the sea provides a context of navigational freedom that is
essential in meeting national objectives. A high degree of mobility across the broad
oceans, through choke points and in littoral regions, is a prerequisite to the success
of naval forces in executing the national security strategy.
Mobility can be impeded significantly by international or domestic regulation
in the name of a protected environment. Nations wishing to impose their
sovereignty beyond the internationally recognized 12 mile limit may use
environmental concerns as an instrument of partial leverage. Economic zones can
be redefined to include pollution and waste requirements during peacetime which
serve to impede our freedom of navigation. As the focus on the environment gains
momentum, these types of regulations represent clear dangers. The Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships (APPS) (33 USC 1901-1908) provides for the U.S.
implementation of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL). Although a domestic statute, APPS imposes greater
environmental obligations upon U.S. warships than is required under MARPOL.
Any movement by the international community to implement reciprocal
standards will impact naval operations abroad. Heavily used sea lines of approach,
such as the Straits of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits, are likely candidates for
onerous environmental restrictions. Environmental concerns brought forth by the
possibility of collision or the fact that heavy transit of straits may pollute those
waters could result in regulation which restricts, limits or prohibits transit without
some toll for clean-up. Although hypothetical, many foreign ports already have
anti-pollution regulations: Hong Kong and Singapore to cite a few examples.
Restrictions in accessing ports, either for pollution and waste regulation or for
nuclear safety matters similarly impede our ability to sustain forward presence and
remain engaged globally. Pon visits are integral to supplying, servicing and
providing morale for forces abroad, as well as showing the flag. These are key
elements in the "engagement" policy of our nation. As environmental concerns
grow, we must, in the name of national security, challenge those initiatives that
encroach on our mobility in much the same manner that we must resist regulations
that inappropriately or excessively restrict our free trade upon the oceans and
within the ports of the world.
Another development which can hinder the full mobility of our naval forces
would be any requirement for naval vessels to enforce environmental regulations.
Naval units have already been trained and tasked to maintain continuous vigilance
for driftnet fishing vessels and for ships discharging unusually large quantities of
waste into the oceans. Just as the humanitarian concerns of rescuing "boat people"
around the world interfered with routine operations, a parallel situation can be
drawn in which naval forces required to be engaged in enforcing environmental
regulation lose their focus from primary responsibilities. This tasking, if
significant, could additionally overtax commanders and complicate priorities. To
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maintain our freedom of mobility, naval forces must clearly understand and
maintain a balance between their primary mission and their obligations to the
international community.

Naval Warfighting Doctrine
Sea control, sea denial and power projection are fundamental naval missions.
u.S. naval forces train to these missions through tactical doctrine to become the
most effective combat forces afloat. The precise operations and tactics executed
during war support the naval doctrine that will hopefully yield the greatest success
in battle. Dominance of the sea and power projection ashore will inevitably result
in the sinking of warships, mining of harbors or striking at strategic centers of
gravity. Understanding the environmental impact of these evolutions, naval
commanders have an obligation to weigh the expected and necessary
environmental impact of the evolution against meeting the military objective.
However, to what extent must the commander maneuver to avoid a wildlife refuge?
Will a commander be required to select limited precision munitions over "dumb"
weapons because ofpossible collateral damage to the environment? In war, to fight
and win will always be of primary concern. Therefore, commanders must fight
without unnecessary uncertainty of the tactical options available. The law of war,
over time, has evolved to include sanctuaries during armed conflict which have
the general support of the international community. With due regard to the law
ofwar, commanders must follow the doctrine they have applied in training in order
to optimize their chances of success in conflict.
Targeting, as with doctrine and tactics, requires the utmost clarity in order to
meet military objectives. Again, the law of war has established sanctuaries such as
cultural locations, hospitals and religious monuments, and has prohibited targets
such as dams-which if severely damaged could unleash forces which would create
extensive collateral damage. Any alternative targets selected by virtue of
environmental concerns must be weighed against the consequences and impact
those alternatives may have on the success and risks of the entire military
operation. History has many examples of significant military targeting decisions
which were made with due regard to humanitarian concerns and which changed
the course of the battle. Environmental damage can be minimized through
cognizance of environmental concerns. But it should remain clear that in war there
are no absolutes; but winning is almost everything.

Weapons
It goes without saying that our naval forces must be properly trained and
equipped to fight and win the nation's wars. Naval forces must be provided with
those weapons which will give our forces the clear advantage in conflict. With the

40 Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict

scaling down of our naval forces, it is more important now than ever to field
munitions which can do the job effectively with fewer numbers. Our current
arsenal of strike weapons, over-the-horizon (OTH) missiles, naval gun projectiles
~nd mines are moving towards precision applications which, by definition, will
reduce collateral damage to the environment. However, less damage to the
environment is a fallout from developing precision munitions and not the key
factor in their development. The weapon development process currently analyzes
potential environmental consequences with respect to applicable laws and
regulations pertaining to pollution, hazardous material and ecological impact. 4
Full compliance with these regulations can lead to excessive cost and or
modifications to the weapon. We must, therefore, seek a balance between optimum
weapon performance and total environmental compliance. Blast effects, heat, and
residual by-products from fuel or explosives must be considered in the
development of weapons to ensure that they can first meet the capability
requirements. It should continue to be our primary concern that we provide our
fleet the arsenal needed to inflict high levels of damage on hostile forces in order
to bring conflict to a decisive, early conclusion and minimize risk to our forces.
An early conclusion also can reduce death, destruction and environmental damage.
Conclusion

Environmental regulations, foreign and domestic, must be clearly written so as
not to be misinterpreted by local or state agencies or by the international
community, nor to place unwarranted restrictions on naval forces beyond the
intent of the regulations. Mobility is fundamental to naval forces; both in peace
and war. Regulations that restrict transits of naval vessels due to environmental
concerns ignore the importance of mobility and freedom of navigation to naval
forces in crisis, peacetime operations and training. Although the need to protect
the environment is clear and widely accepted, international regulations that place
absolute prohibitions on environmental impact will probably receive minimum
support and inconsistent compliance from countries with significant military
forces. As a practical matter, application of environmental regulations to the
wartime operations of military forces must recognize that avoiding environmental
impact cannot be the sole consideration. But military commanders can
legitimately be expected to show regard for avoiding unnecessary environmental
damage in the conduct of their operations.
The U.S. National Military Strategy is built upon the three pillars of
peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and
winning our nation's wars. 5 Naval forces, in support of this strategy, will be
forward deployed, and manned, equipped and trained to fight and win. 6 The
naval imperatives of realistic, demanding operational training, unimpeded
mobility at sea, proven warfighting doctrine and effective weapons are crucial
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to the success of naval forces. Environmental regulations that infringe on these
naval imperatives could seriously limit the Navy's ability to carry out national
strategy. In essence, naval forces, by their forward and credible capability, actin a
preventive role against war •.. and the environmental damage that is so involved.
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